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A Comparative Review of Quantitative VFM Methodology for 
PPP Infrastructure Project in Indonesia and Australia 
 
Pangeran Moch Husnullah1, Pribadi Krishna Suryanto2 and Susilawati, Connie3 
 
Abstract: The Government of Indonesia (GoI) increasingly relies on the private sector financing to build and operate infrastructures 
through public private partnership (PPP) schemes. However, PPP does not automatically provide the solution for the financing scheme due 
to value for money (VFM) issues. The procurement authority must show whether a PPP proposal is the optimal solution that provides best 
VFM outcome. The paper presents a literature review of comparing quantitative VFM methodology for PPP infrastructure project 
procurement in Indonesia and Australia. Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is used to assess the potential project VFM quantitatively in 
Australia. In Indonesia, the PSC has not been applied, where the PPP procurement authority tends to utilize a common project evaluation 
method that ignores the issues of risk. Unlike the conventional price bid evaluation, the PSC enables a financial comparison including 
costs/gains and risks. Since the construction of PSC is primarily on risk management approach, it can facilitate risk negotiation processes 
between the involved parties. The study indicates that the quantitative VFM methodology of PSC is potentially applicable in Indonesia for 
water supply sector. Various supporting regulations are available that emphasize the importance of VFM and risk management in 
infrastructure investment. However, the study also reveals a number of challenges that need to be anticipated, such as the need of a more 
comprehensive PPP policy at both central and local government level, a more specific legal instrument for bidding evaluation method and 
the issue of institutional capacity development in PPP Units at the local level. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) has commenced ambitious 
agendas in infrastructure development after 1997’s economic 
crisis. As part of sector reform (in particular the water supply 
sector), several related laws and regulations has been revised and 
launched, i.e. Law No. 7/2004 on Water Resources and 
Government Regulation (GR) No. 16/2005 on Drinking Water 
Provision System (SPAM) that legalizes the involvement of private 
sector investment in infrastructure through public private 
partnership (PPP) schemes. The GoI has introduced regulation, 
summit and exhibition to promote implementation of PPP schemes 
for attracting infrastructure investment. Recently refined PPP 
regulation is released to meet the latest market situation. The 
Presidential Regulation (PR) No. 13/2010 replaced PR No. 
67/2005 concerning PPP in Infrastructure Provision.  The previous 
regulation revoked the previous PPP law, Presidential Decree No. 
7/1998. The GoI also initiates Indonesia Infrastructure Summit in 
year 2005 followed by the Indonesia Infrastructure Exhibition in 
year 2006; both are forum to promote infrastructure investment in 
across region in Indonesia. However, PPP investment in Indonesia 
is less attractive to private sector. 
  There is a good lesson learned from two big PPP concessions 
scheme for water supply provision in West and East area of Jakarta 
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City (capital of Indonesia), signed in year 1998. As reported in 
Lanti, et.al (2008), the concessions (both procured by direct 
negotiation) have demonstrated that risks inherent in contract due 
to unanticipated and underestimated potential future problems, 
such as severe economic crisis and political instability, have caused 
the failure of VFM achievement. The contracts did not function 
well and eventually renegotiated where most of the terms on 
performance targets, capital investment, and tariffs adjustment 
mechanism were readjusted.  
Theoretically, there are many reasons as to why governments 
need to take PPP schemes, among the most prominent being the 
achievement of improved VFM, or improved services for the same 
amount of money, as the public sector would spend to deliver a 
similar project or service (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Despite it 
recognition by many, there are no simple or automatic solutions for 
this financing scheme. In a generic sense, VFM can be achieved 
when risk is allocated to the involved parties in an appropriate and 
efficient manner. 
Learning from past experiences, the procurement stage is 
crucial as PPP is compared to traditional project delivery methods.  
A PPP project has insufficient information to make more 
predictable assuptions to the parties like in tradional project 
develivery methods (Hurst and Reeves, 2004). Consequently, the 
procurement authority plays a vital role in managing the PPP 
procurement process in particular to ensure whether a PPP proposal 
is the optimal solution that provides best VFM outcome for the 
public sector.  
This paper presents comparison of quantitative VFM 
methodology for PPP infrastructure project procurement in 
Indonesia and Australia. In many developed countries, such as UK, 
European countries and Australia Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
is used to assess the potential VFM of PPP option quantitatively. 
This concept is literally has not been applied in Indonesia. The PPP 
procurement authority tends to utilize a common project evaluation 
method that ignores specific issue of risk. Different from 
conventional price bid evaluation, the PSC enables a financial 
comparison including costs/gains and risks. Since the construction 
of PSC model is primarily risk management approach, it can serve 
as a tool to facilitate risk negotiation processes between involved 
parties. The study is limited on PPP in water supply sector and is 
aimed at looking for the potential application of quantitative VFM 
methodology of PSC in Indonesia.  
 
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF PPP FOR INFRASTUCTURE 
PROVISION IN INDONESIA 
 
2.1 History of PPP Implementation 
 
Indonesia’s experience in managing private sector involvement in 
infrastructure provision is actually not new and was one of East 
Asia’s private infrastructure success stories in 1990s. Indonesia 
attracted the second highest share (27%) of private infrastructure 
investment after the Philippines (28%) where energy and telecom 
sectors captured the majority of investment, followed by transport, 
and water and sanitation (World Bank, 2004). However, Private 
sector infrastructure investments in Indonesia severely decrease 
following the economic crisis with only $1.5 billion in 1998.  
In the upstream oil and gas industry, it has been implemented 
since 1970s. In the power/electricity sector was initiated through 
implementation of Paiton IPP (Independent Power Producer) 
Project in 1994. In the toll road, the involvement of private sector 
was begun in 1983. In the water supply sector, the first PPP project 
is based on BOT (build-operate-transfer) scheme in Denpasar, Bali 
in 1993, then water supply concession scheme in Batam City (near 
Singapore) in 1995. In 1998, the modified concessions in Western 
and Eastern part of Jakarta. Up to now, there are at least 24 PPP 
projects in the water supply sector including two projects on the 
operation stages of using the BOT scheme tendered in 2005, i.e. 
Banjarmasin water treatment plant (WTP) project 500 l/sec and 
Samarinda WTP project 400 l/sec (BPPSPAM, 2010), both located 
in Kalimantan (Borneo) island.  
In Jakarta, the selection of private operator is done by direct 
negotiation, to follow-up President Suharto guidelines on the 
importance of PPP (Lanti, et.al, 2008). After long and tiring 
negotiation from 1995, in 1998, two 25-year concession contracts 
were awarded to the private operator for the provision of drinking 
water service. The concession is divided into two zones, i.e. West 
Zone was awarded to a joint venture of Suez (originally Lyonnaise 
des Eaux,), and the East Zone for Thames Water International. 
Both consortiums are made up from an international and an 
Indonesian company. The Indonesian joint venture partners on both 
consortiums had strong ties to the regime of President Suharto. On 
the government side, the contract signatory was PAM Jaya (the 
publicly owned water utility company, which also took on the role 
of monitoring the contract (Jensen, 2005).  
Jakarta Drinking Water Regulation Board shows that after ten 
years concession, the two private firms are not able to improve its 
service coverage in accordance to requirements (Lanti, et.al., 
2008).  BPPSPAM (2007) argued that the operational performance 
of the two firms is still inefficient. The non-revenue water in 
Jakarta was over 50 percent and higher than national average of 39 
percent. More than 30 percent of connected customers were not 
served in term 24 hours a day. Moreover, the average water tariff 
in Jakarta is higher than other cities in Southeast Asian countries, 
such as Bangkok, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, also if 
compared with most of municipal in Indonesia. This indicates that 
Jakarta’s concession was failed to deliver project VFM. The failure 
to achieve VFM has caused renegotiation and readjustment of most 
of the terms on performance targets, capital investment, and tariffs 
adjustment mechanism. 
2.2 PPP Law and Regulation 
 
Prior to the reform era, the development and planning of various 
infrastructures project including the granting of concessions was 
conducted by the Agency for National Development Planning 
(BAPPENAS). In the water supply sector, the process was mostly 
delegated to the related technical ministries at the central level, i.e. 
Ministry of Public Works (MPW), Ministry of Home Affair 
(MoHA), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Health (MoH), 
and State Ministry of Environment (SME). Although at the 
planning level it was coordinated, the implementation was 
conducted in each related sector. Moreover, the granting of 
concession in was used as a facility for collusion by certain parties 
having the access to the authority to obtain concession in the 
sector. As a result, the concessions could not fully achieve the 
targeted performance. 
The GoI initiated the improvement of PPP implementation 
through introduction of legislations.  Several regulations relating to 
the implementation of PPP has been arranged in both specific 
sector and cross-sector infrastructure. In particular to the water 
supply sector, a Law No. 7/2004 on Water Resources has been 
passed focusing on the provision for sustainable water resources, 
the management of water supply and wastewater, including private 
sector participation. A complementing regulation, GR No. 16/2005 
has also been issued, which provides that the funding for SPAM 
development shall cover the funding for building, expanding and 
improving the physical (technical) and non-physical systems. In 
addition to the central and/or regional government and state owned 
enterprise (SOE), the funding resources may be originated from 
private legal entities (under PPP schemes). 
The latest PPP cross-sector regulation is the issuance of PR 
No. 13/2010, which is a revision of PR No. 67/2005. It is intended 
to give certainty and increasing the attractiveness of private 
infrastructure investment, to synchronize with the latest prevailing 
regulations on infrastructure provision, and to clarify the whole 
process of PPP such as government support, the tender process, 
adding value to unsolicited project, and setting the transfer of 
shares (BPPSPAM, 2010). Included in the PR No. 13/2010 are 
some substances related to business competition such as tariffs 
determination, performance standard, sanctions and supervision 
mechanism to private partners, and the right and obligations of the 
parties (including risks allocation). It therefore provides a clear 
instrument for anticipating various anti-competitive behaviors 
especially by private partners as the holders of concession rights.  
However, the implementation of PPP still shows obstacles due 
to some aspects that have not been clearly regulated. For example, 
special regulations on regulatory function are not included in the 
PR No. 13/2010. Consequently, regulatory function still refers to 
sectoral regulations. In the case of water supply, the regulatory 
function is performed by BPPSPAM (Supporting Agency for the 
Development of Drinking Water System Provision, pursuant to GR 
No.16/2005). BPPSPAM is established to achieve the purpose of 
regulating the development of SPAM. Based in Jakarta, BPPSPAM 
is a non-structural agency established by, under and responsible to 
the MoPW carrying out the governmental affairs in the field of 
water resources. In the field, this agency is often lack the power 
when confronted to the cross-sector issues. 
 
 
2.3 PPP Procurement Process 
 
The involvement of the private sector in the development of SPAM 
in Indonesia shall be conducted based on a fair competition 
principle through auction procedure in accordance with the 
prevailing laws and regulations, which may cover all or part of the 
development phases of SPAM. According to the GR No. 16/2005, 
private sector in obtaining the right to develop SPAM based on an 
auction process has to execute the agreement with the government 
or regional government. Although the GR contains many aspects of 
private infrastructure procurement, the detailed auction procedure 
should be further regulated by a minister regulation. 
Based on PR No. 13/2010, the process for PPP infrastructure 
project procurement is divided into two phases, i.e. procurement 
preparation and procurement implementation. Preparation stage is 
consist of: review of existing condition; local government (LG) 
statement; project identification; public consultation; capacity 
building; institutional aspect; and legal aspect. Included in the 
implementation stage are: initial explanation; project scoping; 
preparation of the tender documents; pre-qualification process; and 
bidding process.  
In general, the PPP procurement process introduces many 
modifications due to infrastructure project complexity. However, 
the process of getting the tender winner is not exactly different with 
the common Indonesia’s public procurement regulations as defined 
in the Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Technical Guidelines on 
Government’s Procurement of Goods/ Services. In this context, the 
process of selection the tender winner is split into two stages, i.e. 
pre-qualification process or invitation for expression of interest for 
prospective tender participants; and the bidding process including 
the request for proposals from the short-list bidders and the 
tendering process. 
Moreover, PR No. 13/2010 has not been specifically directing 
the method for proposal evaluation. The regulation only specifies 
some general guideline that the procurement team must provide an 
explanation to the participants pertaining to the enclosed their 
documents along with the tender document, terms and procedure of 
evaluation related to price preference for the use of domestic 
products, and method for proposal evaluation. In most cases, the 
tender documents including business case was prepared by external 
professional consultants. In practice, the procurement team usually 
applies a tender guideline stipulated in the MoPW Decision No. 
409 year 2002 concerning Guidance for PPP in the Development 
and Management of Water Supply and Sanitation.  
In selection of the tender winner, the procurement team uses a 
competition system. It evaluates bids by examining and comparing 
bid documents to fulfill the requirements as tender documents. The 
sequence of evaluation starts from evaluation of administrative 
requirements, technical requirements, and reasonability of price. In 
the case of bidder is unable to pass the evaluation in every phase, it 
is declared fail. The double-envelope method is used for the 
submission of bid documents, wherein administrative and technical 
requirements are inserted into the first envelope, while the bid price 
is put into the second envelope and later the first and second 
enveloped are inserted into one envelope (covered envelope) and 
conveyed to procurement committee/official.  
As shown in Figure 1, the technical criteria may include 
project technical plan (basic design, schedule, etc.), service 
performance standard, investment plan and financial projection, 
customer relationship, etc. For financial criteria may consist of 
project financial analysis model of both soft and hard copy and 
assumptions used. To evaluate the financial proposal, the 
procurement team will assess the series of average tariff during 
concession period that based on annuity present value (PV) 
analysis. In this case, project investment risk is compensated by 
using a capital cost that will discount the projected annual cash 
flow. Hence, there no special procedure of risk identification and 
assessment for construction risk, design risk, political risk, and 
market risk, etc. So far there is no documented report has published 
on how the involved parties were arrange and negotiate the risk 
issue and incorporating into the concession contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Framework for PPP Bid Evaluation in Indonesia 
(Annex 3 of MPW Decision No. 409 year 2002, modified) 
 
 
3. PPP PROCUREMENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA  
 
3.1 PPP History in Australia  
 
In general, the use of private financing for the development of 
infrastructure through PPP schemes in Australia can be broadly 
divided into three periods of time, i.e. 1980’s, 1990’s, and post-
2000. As discussed by Jefferies, et.al (2006), the key reason behind 
the use of PPP before 1990’s was the pressure due to poor balance 
of trades, excessive high debt, government borrowing limit capped 
by loans council, poor fiscal management. Australian Government 
seeks alternative methods for development without further 
reducing credit ratings. In this period, NSW government first 
documented a formal procedures and controls governing private 
sector participation. In the period of year 1990’s, the role of the 
private sector was expanded to encompass design, construction, 
finance, operation, and delivery of services to achieve significant 
efficiencies through competition that supported by Competition 
Principles Agreement endorsed by all Australian governments. 
During this period, a number of privatizations and outsourcing take 
place across Australia.  
Post 2000 period is characterized by the increased of usage of 
government policies and guidelines on PPP procurement in most 
jurisdiction. The development of PPP is based on value for money 
policy that protects public interest with a focus on whole-of-life 
costing and optimal risk transfer. According to Skliros and Perrins, 
2007), the current relevant policies in each of the major 
jurisdictions are (1) New South Wales: Working with Government 
Policy for Privately Financed Projects; (2) Victoria: Partnerships 
Victoria Policy; (3) Queensland: PPP Policy (supported by the 
Value for Money Framework); (4) South Australia: Partnerships 
South Australia Policy; (5) Western Australia: Partnerships for 
Growth Policy; (6) Tasmania: Private Sector Participation in Public 
Infrastructure Provision Policy; (7) Northern Territory: Territory 
Partnerships Policy Framework; (8) Australian Capital Territory: 
Policy for the Private Provision of Public Infrastructure; and 
Federal Government: Commonwealth Policy Principles for the Use 
of Private Financing.  
 
 
3.2 Government Policy on Value for Money 
 
The Government of Australian recognizes that properly formulated 
of PPP can provide significant benefits to the public sector, such as 
access to specialist expertise and innovation, and the opportunity to 
transfer risk to those better able to manage (AG DFA, 2006). A 
core principle that underpins PPP procurement is VFM that should 
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be assessed on a whole-of-life and whole-of-government basis. 
VFM drivers of PPP include: innovation, risk transfer, improved 
asset utilization, ownership, and management synergies, and 
improved project management. Innovation means that the private 
sector’s has the ability to provide an innovative solution to the 
project. The ability of risk transfer is one of the most powerful 
drivers of PPP based on principles that risks should be allocated to 
the party best able to manage risks for the resulting of optimum 
business outcome. Improved asset utilization may give the private 
operator a scope to generate third party income, allow more 
efficient utilization of economic assets and hence spread fixed 
costs more effectively. The ownership of an asset by the same 
entity responsible for the service delivery component of the output 
can provide significant benefits through synergies. A PPP could 
lead to improve project management, in terms of cost, time, and 
operating efficiency of the end product.  
Most state governments are committed at improving the PPP 
process and working closely with the PPP sector to streamline 
bidding costs. They has already taken many industry suggestions 
on board, including adopting standard commercial principles in 
PPP projects and increasing the usage of the interactive tender 
process in projects. Various policies and guidelines are have 
developed, particularly on the processes and methodologies for 
PPP procurement, e.g. Victoria (GV DTF, 2001), Queensland (QG 
DSD, 2001), and New South Wales (NSW Treasury, 2006). Allen 
Consulting Group (ACG, 2007) was studied 21 PPP projects and 
33 Traditional projects located in New South Wales (19), 
Queensland (9) and Victoria. The study analyzes the relative 
efficacy of PPP and Traditional procurement in relation to cost and 
time over-runs. In the report to the Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia, ACG (2007) concluded that PPP demonstrates superior 
performance over Traditional project in both the cost and time 
dimensions, and that the PPP advantage increases with the size and 
complexity of projects.  
 
 
3.3 Quantitative Value for Money Methodology: 
Case of Partnership Victoria 
 
Risk assessment and management is an important aspect in the 
determination of VFM and as a deciding factor in many PPP 
proposals (AG DFA, 2006). Hence, VFM methodology is primarily 
on risk assessment and management. In most jurisdiction, e.g. 
Victoria (GV DTF, 2001a), the evaluation of PPP proposal is 
concerned at identifying the method of delivering a project that 
will provide the best VFM outcome. As shown in Figure 2, it is 
based on both qualitative basis (non-financial criteria) and financial 
criteria (quantitative).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Partnership Victoria bids – common evaluation 
factor (GW DTF, 2003, pp 12, modified) 
In the assessment of VFM in financial terms is estimated by 
compare the costs of PPP proposals against a neutral benchmark, 
called Public Sector Comparator (PSC) which is developed by the 
agency (and its advisers) in consultation with the PPP Unit. The 
PSC should reflect the most efficient public sector delivery option 
likely to be achieved for the relevant project. PSC is a model 
assuming if the project were procured entirely by the public sector 
using a traditional project delivery method. The reference project 
as the basis for PSC should be a real alternative, capable of public 
sector implementation through traditional project delivery method 
such as turnkey contract for designing and constructing the asset, 
and operation & maintenance (OM) contract. There is considerable 
guidance that specifies on constructing a PSC, “The Partnerships 
Victoria Guidance Material, Public Sector Comparator, Technical 
Note” (GW DTF, 2001a).  
PSC is generally categorized into four core elements: raw PSC 
(base costs), transferable risk (to the private sector), retained risk 
(by government), and competitive neutrality. Retained risk is the 
value of risks that government proposes to bear itself; whereas 
transferable risk is the value of risks that are likely to be allocated 
to the private party. In practice, the PSC is constructed and refined 
during the feasibility and business case stages of a project prior to 
release of the tender documents, and thus before bids are received. 
There are two reasons for this (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). First, it 
is essential to ensure that the PSC is a ‘pure’ public sector option, 
not influenced by ideas coming from PPP bidders. Second, its 
wider value to the procurement process will be enhanced if it is 
prepared early as it will help with detailed project definition and in 
anticipating what a private sector bid will need to deliver in order 
to improve VFM compared to the PSC. Based on discounted cash 
flow (DCF) method, VFM is demonstrated when the total present 
value cost of private sector supply is less than the net present value 
(NPV) of the base cost of the service, adjusted for the cost of risks 
retained by the government, cost adjustments for transferable risk, 
and competitive neutrality effects. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 
 
Unlike Australia, there is no ultimate concept of quantitative VFM 
methodology of PSC is applied in Indonesia. As shown in Table 1, 
the evaluation of financial proposal in the PPP procurement in 
Indonesia is calculated by ignores the risks issue. 
Table 1: Comparisons for the quantitative VFM methodology 
of PPP project in Australia and Indonesia 
PSC 
Structure 
Australia (Victoria) Indonesia 
Raw PSC The Raw PSC (should not include any 
valuation of risks) comprises direct 
costs (costs that can be traced or 
assigned to a particular service), 
indirect costs (other costs incurred 
that are not directly related to the 
production of the services); less any 
identifiable third-party revenue.  
Financial model should 
include, e.g. capital 
expenditure, operational 
expenditure, third party 
revenue, etc. 
Retained 
risks 
Adjusted cost of risks to be retained 
by the government  
N/A 
Transferred 
risks 
Cost adjustments for transferable risk 
to the private party 
N/A 
Competitive 
neutrality 
This removes the net competitive 
advantages that accrue to a govt. 
business by virtue of its public sector 
ownership), e.g. use of an appropriate 
cost of capital to discount cash flows, 
quantify the amount of land tax a 
bidder would incur, etc. 
Financial model should 
use an appropriate cost 
of capital to discount 
cash flows, and applies 
relevant govt. regulation 
on revenue taxes, 
property taxes, etc. 
VFM Evaluation
Quantitative Qualitative
PSC vs Bid
Impact on core 
govt. services
Sustainability Service delivery
Design 
amenity
Unquantifiable 
risks
Credit issues
Tax issues
Experience
However, the principles or “driver” of VFM are actually 
addressed in the PR No. 13/2010. The PR states that the objectives 
of PPP is to improve the quantity, quality and efficiency of 
infrastructure service through fair competition; and to encourage 
asset utilization by introducing principle of user paying for the 
received services. This is in line with Law No. 5/1999 on 
Prohibition of Monopoly Practice and Unfair Business Competition 
that aimed to create conducive and fair business climate to improve 
efficiency. In addition is the GR No. 8/2007 on Government 
Investment that stipulates infrastructure investment must satisfy 
social, economic, or other cost/benefit analysis.  
Several regulations also emphasized the importance of risk 
assessment in infrastructure investment. This is accordance with 
the principle of PSC that is primarily on risk assessment and 
management. For example, the GR No. 8/2007 states that risk 
analysis in infrastructure project planning should be performed on 
prudent based and allocated to ensure its efficiency and 
effectiveness. Risk issue is also the main concern of PR No. 
13/2010, that PPP contract should be includes risk allocation, based 
on principle that risks should be allocated to the parties that are 
best able to control and manage the risks. The regulation already 
addresses that management of political risk, performance risk, and 
demand risk are central and should be included in the PPP 
agreement. To follow-up, the MoF was issuance the Decree No. 
38/PMK.01/2006 on Implementing Instructions for Controlling and 
Managing Risks in Infrastructure Provision. To support its 
implementation by strong and stable institutions, the MoF was 
issuance the Decree No. 518/KMK.01/ 2005 on the Establishment 
of Risk Management Unit (RMU) for PPP Process. Unfortunately, 
the task force only for the purpose at identifying, evaluating and 
controlling risk that having potency at burdening state's finance.  
Overall, the existence of a various supporting regulations is 
generally indicates the potential applicability of quantitative VFM 
methodology in Indonesia. In addition to the regulation that have 
addressed the principles of VFM, the Government of Indonesian is 
basically has awareness on risk management. However, the study 
also reveals a number of issues as challenges that need to be 
concerned, as follow: 
 
 
4.1 Policy Synchronization 
 
Australia is a federation of six states and two federal territories and 
includes three level of government. At the first level, the Federal 
Parliament’s authority includes, e.g. social welfare, education and 
hospital services. Each state has its own parliament, executive 
government, and judiciary, and has the power to set laws on 
matters relating to the state. As the second level of government, the 
state government plays a direct role in the delivery of most major 
infrastructure services, e.g. health care, transport, and water. The 
federal government also plays roles either directly in these areas at 
macro level, or indirectly through the terms and condition it applies 
to funding grants to support such activities. The third level of 
government is local government at the city, town, municipal, or 
shire level (English and Guthrie, 2002). 
There is no specific legal or statutory framework relation to 
PPP infrastructure project procurement has been developed in 
Australia. However, recent years there has been increased the 
usage of government policies and guidelines on PPP procurement 
in most jurisdiction. In general, government system in Australia 
allows broad authority for each state/territory to develop its 
independent PPP policy. Within this context, most States have 
special legislation which is intended to facilitate delivery of 
complex PPP projects by centralising and streamlining planning 
approval and its implementation. 
Indonesian government is consisting central government and 
local government (province, and municipal/regency government). 
As consequence of a unitary state, power is concentrated in the 
central government. The highest representative body at central 
level is the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) that comprises 
two houses; the People's Representative Council (DPR) that passes 
legislation and monitors the executive branch, and the Regional 
Representative Council (DPD) as a new chamber for matters of 
regional management. Under decentralization and autonomy Law, 
responsibility for providing infrastructure/service (e.g. water) is in 
the hand of the Local Government (LG). The governance structure 
at the local level is represented by Regional Head (Governor, 
Regent/Mayor) and the Local Parliament (DPRD). In the context of 
PPP implemented at the local level, it should be with the approval 
of the DPRD. However, there are several Ministries at central level 
that have primary responsibility for the water supply sector, 
especially for the implementation of PPP.  
After Law No. 32/2004, the responsibilities of MoPW at the 
regional level have transferred to the LG. However, MoPW still 
retained the responsibility for determining policies and standards, 
including guidelines for PPP. MoHA is the implementing agency 
for Law No. 32/2004. MoHA also issued guidelines on cooperation 
between PDAM (publicly owned local water company) and third 
parties, another regulation of PPP. Through the Directorate of PPP 
Development, BAPPENAS functions to carry out the preparation 
of policy, coordination, synchronization implementation of the 
preparation and evaluation of national development planning in the 
field of PPP development, and monitoring and assessing its 
implementation. Hence, the GoI is faced the challenges to clarify 
various responsibilities and to harmonize the functions between 
Central and Local Government. Despite the central government 
effort to much infrastructure policy packages, there is no guarantee 
that it will linked with the LG. As reported in World Bank (2004), 
Indonesia’s decentralization program has created uncertainty as to 
which level of government is responsible for the provision of 
infrastructure services. In addition to the unclear role of LG, the 
situation is exacerbated by the fact that some decentralization 
implementing regulations are inconsistent with others, as well as 
with existing national sector regulations.  
 
 
4.2 Institutional Capacity 
 
In Australian Governments view, risk management should be built 
into the agency’s procurement processes to ensure that appropriate 
procedures are in place to identify and consider all relevant risks 
throughout the procurement cycle (AG, 2008). Although there is no 
specific bodies have been set up to oversee the PPP regime in 
Australia, in each jurisdiction a government agency has been 
appointed to take a lead role in implementing policies relating to 
PPPs. According to Skliross and Perrins (2007), among of these 
agencies (and specific branches, where applicable) are: (1) New 
South Wales: New South Wales Treasury (Private Projects 
Branch); (2) Victoria: Victorian Department of Treasury and 
Finance (Commercial and Infrastructure Risk Management Group); 
(3) Queensland: Queensland Treasury, in association with the 
Queensland Coordinator General and the Queensland Department 
of State Development, Trade and Innovation; (4) Western 
Australia: West Australian Department of Treasury and Finance; 
(5) Tasmania: Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance; (6) 
Northern Territory: Northern Territory Department of the Chief 
Minister; (7) Australian Capital Territory: Australian Capital 
Territory Department of Treasury; and (8) Federal: Department of 
Finance and Administration (as well as Department of Defence for 
defence-related PPPs). 
In general, the implementation of PPP in Indonesia at the central 
government level has been supported by specialized agency that 
established in the relevant ministries. For example is Risk 
Management Unit (RMU) that established by MoF to support the 
processes of risk assessment for the project that need government 
support. However, implementation of PPP at the local level faces 
two major constraints. Firstly, LG must develop their capabilities 
to perform contracts with the private sector, either directly or 
indirectly through PDAM. Secondly, most of LG is facing 
institutional constraints in term they do not have special ability for 
transacting PPP. Within this context, public sector organizations 
responsible for the procurement of PPP in water supply sector in 
Indonesia are relatively weak in term their capability at performing 
risk management processes and techniques (Pribadi and Pangeran, 
2010). Hence, the improvement of institutional capacity is needed 
to enhance LG capabilities in PPP project arrangement, especially 
in risk management field. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper presents a literature review comparing quantitative VFM 
methodology for PPP infrastructure project procurement in 
Indonesia and Australia. It is based on the understanding that 
countries with experiences in managing PPP project like Australia, 
a PSC model is applied to assess the potential VFM of the PPP 
options. The PSC enables financial comparison including costs/ 
gains and risks, hence, it can serve as an evaluation method which 
includes risk transfer aspect to facilitate risk negotiation. The study 
indicates that the quantitative VFM methodology is potentially 
applicable in Indonesian as there are various supporting regulations. 
This reflects by the existence of several regulations that address the 
principles of VFM, and showed the awareness of the GoI on the 
importance of risk management. However, the study also reveals a 
number of challenges that need to be anticipated by policy-makers, 
such as the need of a more comprehensive PPP policy at both 
central and local government level, and the issue of institutional 
capacity development in PPP Units, especially at the local level.  
Prior to develop and implement a PSC, the GoI is necessary to 
provide a more comprehensive guideline for PPP process.  
Therefore, specific guidelines that complement the regulation on 
PPP in infrastructure provision required to be developed. 
Particularly, the guideline focuses on the setting of the criteria, 
mechanisms and procedures for a robust VFM methodology. 
Related to the LG capability on risk management, it is should be 
acknowledged that the process for enhancing its capability likely 
requires longer time. In this context, the technical skills can be 
developed by involving professional consultant services. Its 
purpose is for knowledge transfer to the government staff that later 
will become the core staff of the PPP unit. 
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